洞爺湖ウィンザーホテルの正面


７月１０日の「トロント大学のジョン・カートンによる洞爺湖サミットの評価について」というエントリーを書いた時には見つからなかったG8サミットについての評価が１１日になって更新され、評価も見つかった。コメント欄でお知らせくださったみなさま、ありがとうございました。

John Kirton: A Summit of Steady Success: The Performance of the 2008 G8" (Updated July 11, 2008)

の中の

A Summit of Substantial Success:The Performance of the 2008 G8
John Kirton, Director, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto (July 11, 2008)

という論文の３７ページにGBの結果（G8Results)という項目があり、４２ページまでG8の評価が書かれている。

訳：
G8　結果
２００８年洞爺湖G8サミットは実質的な成功を収めた。Robert Putnam と Nicholas　Bayneによって開発された基準によると、B+か７８％の成績に値した。サミットの中心議題であった「気候変動」においては著しい成功を手に入れ、そして開発とアフリカ、食の安全、責任能力とジンバブエ問題、さまざまな問題における管理能力では大きな前進を果たした。しかし、世界経済を統治するという点においては失敗であった。

又、４３ページ以降は参考文献や資料となり、７７ページにゴミ売りが使ったG8の評価が一目でわかる表（Appendix O: 2008 G8 Summit Grades）がある。Previous Peak(緑で表示）というのは、過去に行われたサミットでの最高点。過去にサミットが何年にどの国で行われたのかを見るのは主要国首脳会議（ウィキペディア）が詳しい。

Appendix O: 2008 G8 Summit Grades
John Kirton, July 9, 2008

　　　　　　Hokkaido 　　　　　　　　　　　　Previous Peak
Overall B+ (78%) 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A (1978)
Climate change and environment A A+ (1979)
Major Economies Meeting B
World economy and energy C– A (1975, 1978, 1979)
Development and Africa A– A (2005)
Food security B+
Political issues B–
Zimbabwe A–
Counterterrorism C+
Reform B+
Prime Minister Fukuda as chair A (85%)

Graded by John Kirton according to the Putnam-Bayne framework, with added emphasis on declared presidency　priorities and the core democratic mission of the G8.

英語の原文を読んでみると、気候変動についても、福田首相についても、結果の割りにこの論文はかなり福田首相に対して好意的に書かれていることがわかる。

２００２年にカナダでサミットが行われたときも、ジャン・クレチエンが呼びかけたアフリカに援助することに参加国の首脳が全員一致で同意した例を出して、福田も地球温暖化問題で京都議定書に代わる枠組みを提示し、それに対してG8首脳全員が前向きな姿勢を示したことを評価しているところはまさに甘すぎると言っていいだろう。カナダでサミットが行われたときは、結局サミットではアフリカを援助することに各国の首脳が同意したものの、実際援助は行われなかったという結果となったことからも、今回も前向きな姿勢は見せても、実際に京都議定書に代わる枠組みが守られるかとなると難しいものがあるのではないだろうか。

トロント大学のG８研究グループのスポンサーのページを見てみると、米国や日本政府（Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development）がついていることから、きっと日本に不利になるようなことは書かなかったのだろう。

最後に、主要国首脳会議を読んだら、日本でサミットが開催される年のジンクスが書かれていたので紹介しよう。

日本で開催される年は、必ず衆議院が解散、総選挙が行われている（1979年東京の大平正芳・1986年東京の中曽根康弘・1993年東京の宮沢喜一・2000年沖縄の森喜朗）。 総選挙が行われる理由として「国際的に注目を浴び、イメージが上昇したところで与党は選挙をやりたいと考えるから」や「サミットの準備がある中で政治的混乱をきたすことが出来ない」などが挙げられる。

（時事通信　６月１３日）


これを読んで今年もやはり衆議院が解散されるのではないかとの思いを強めたのだが、時事通信のこれまでの内閣支持率の推移を見ると、サミット後、果たして福田首相のイメージが上昇することになるかどうかは疑問であり、サミット後に支持率が低下することも十分考えられる。今年はこのジンクスを破ることにならなければいいが・・・・。


その他の参考記事：

内閣支持横ばい２６％　サミット、半数評価せず（神戸新聞News７月１２日）

共同通信社が主要国首脳会議（北海道洞爺湖サミット）閉幕を受け１１、１２両日に実施した全国電話世論調査で、福田内閣の支持率は２６・８％と、前回６月調査の２５・０％にほぼ並ぶ横ばいとなった。不支持率は６・７ポイント減の５３・５％。福田康夫首相のサミット議長としての指導力を「評価しない」が５１・４％で「評価する」の３０・３％を大きく上回った。

支持する政権の枠組みは「民主党中心」が４・９ポイント増の４５・３％、「自民党中心」が３・９ポイント減の３１・２％。４回連続で民主党中心が上回り、その差は前回の５・３ポイントから１４・１ポイントに拡大した。

政党別支持率は、自民党と民主党がともに２８・６％で、自民党が０・５ポイント減らし、民主党は５・０ポイント増やした。

北朝鮮に対する経済制裁の一部解除方針に「賛成」は２４・２％にとどまり、「反対」が６１・９％に及んだ。サミットで地球温暖化対策が「前進したと思う」は３７・２％、「前進したとは思わない」は５６・２％だった。

経済界、洞爺湖サミットで談話　「指導力に敬意」「成果乏しい」（日経新聞　７月９日）

「2050年半減」盛らず　主要排出国の首脳宣言、ポスト京都へ試練（日経新聞　７月９日）

主役と舞台（読売新聞　７月２日）

福田総理は潔く衆議院解散、総選挙を行うべきだと思ったら、今日もランキングの応援よろしくお願いします。


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【More・・・】

G8 Results
The G8’s 2008 Toyako gathering proved to be a summit of substantial success. It was
worthy of a grade of B+, or 78%. on the scale pioneered by Robert Putnam and Nicholas
Bayne It was marked by a striking success on its centerpiece subject of climate change,
substantial advances on development and Africa, food security, accountability and
Zimbabwe, solid management of its many other issues but a serious failure in governing
the global economy.
Climate Change
On the centrepiece priority of climate change Toyako produced a full A performance. It
affirmed a new set of norms that put in place alternative architecture for controlling
carbon of far more prospective effectiveness than the fundamentally flawed and failed
Kyoto regime. The G8 agreed that all major carbon polluters must control their carbon,
that all G8 members, now including the United States and Russia would do so, and that
their long term goal was a reduction of at least 50% of emissions by 2050. It declared that
midterm targets and national plans were needed, and that the bottom-up sectoral approach
pioneered by Japan was a useful tool. They boldly bound themselves to a far reaching
midterm target, with the words: “…we acknowledged our leadership role and each of us
will implement ambitious economy-wide mid-term goals in order to achieve absolute
emissions reductions…” These bold directions and decisions were reinforced by several
specific medium- and short-term actions. In the mid term, the summit identified energy
efficiency, clean energy, national goals, renewable energy and clean coal by 2020,
through the broad deployment of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology by
that time. In the short term it specified the aviation, maritime, sustainable biofuel sectors,
a nuclear energy infrastructure initiative and 20 CCS demonstration plants by 2010.
To provide incentives for the other major carbon polluters to agree to and support this
architecture and action plan, the G8 offered abundant finance and technology transfer,
trade liberation, sinks, 3R measures and dialogue. On finance the G8 promised scaled up
assistance support for disaster risk reduction, $10 billion in R&D with $6 billion so far
for the Climate Investment Funds, more for the Global Environmental Facility and a
reminder it was providing more than $100 billion by 2010 to the CEIF. On trade it
offered free trade in carbon-reducing products, services and remanufactured goods. On
sinks it supported REDD, legal logging, forest fire protection and biodiversity cobenefits.
The major developing countries responded, in partnership under the MEM, with just
enough commitments on their part to put the new G8-pioneered architecture firmly in
place. They said clearly “we will do more” and “will continue to improve our policies
and our performance.” They further pledged to control their own carbon with the words
“developing major economies will pursue … nationally appropriate mitigation actions …
with a view to achieving a deviation from business as usual emissions.” They thus made a
politically binding commitment to control their own carbon, just as the G8 had asked.
Kirton/7/11/08 10:41 PM 38
To give life to these commitments, the developing economies through the MEM
declaration promised several actions that were highly compatible with the G8’s plan in
both the short and medium term. In the short term up to 2012, they endorsed the sectoral
approach and improving efficiency through it and promised to “improve significantly
energy efficiency.” In the medium term they emphasized how sinks could help stabilize
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and identified deforestation, forest degradation,
forest fires, forest governance and land use and its change. For the long term they
supported a “shared vision” of co-operative action with a “global goal for emissions
reductions.” They bluntly affirmed “deep cuts in global emissions will be necessary” and
urged “serious consideration” of “ambitious IPCC scenarios.”
Most broadly the MEM endorsed an agenda that was highly compatible iwt that of the
G8. There was a similar convergence on the basic principles in both. There were only
three major differences: the MEM’s emphasis on the UN process; on financing,
technology transfer and capacity building; a refusal to identify “at least 50% by 2050” as
the long-term goal for themselves.
Amidst this major movement there were some missed opportunities in controlling climate
change. First there was only a small step to endorse nuclear energy as a critical zeroemission
source. Second, there was no effort to end the use of carbon-saturated coal,
beyond the endorsement of the experimental, unproven technology of CCS. Third, there
were no specific measures to stimulate renewables such as wind, solar, geothermal and
hydro, although second-generation biofuels got a verbal boost. Fourth, energy
conservation and the need to reduce received only a passing nod. Fifth, there was no
direct affirmation of or major movement on the 997 commitment to reduce greenhouse
gases by 2010 — now only two years away.
Criticism came from some that G8 leaders were making their 50-2050 commitment from
different base years, rather than the Europeans’ Kyoto favourite of 1990. This criticism
had little merit. There was no scientific rationale for 1990. The increase in emissions
between 1990 and 2008 was much smaller than the business-as-usual increase in the 42
years from 2008 to 2050. The promise of “at least 50%” meant in Japan’s case a 60-80%
reduction, with the additional cut more than compensating for the 1990 to 2008 change.
And there was never any chance that the U.S. or O5 would accept 1990 as the new base
year for themselves.
The World Economy and Ene rgy
On the host’s second priority of the world economy and energy, G8 performance was
poor, worthy of no more than a grade of C– (62%).
The statement opened with a suggestion that all was well with the global economy at
present and that any negatives were merely future risks. It reflected poorly the reality of
the voters struggling to pay or secure their mortgages, get or keep their jobs, and
watching all the major world stock markets shrink by bout 20% since October, outside of
Kirton/7/11/08 10:41 PM 39
Canada (whose economy had contracted in Q1). Consistent with this view that growth
was not a problem, the satement issued tough inflation-fighting words.
This one-paragraph treatment of macroeconomics was followed by a paragraph on
finance. It merely endorsed what the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and G7 finance
ministers had decided to do some time before. The next morning, the major papers
headlined a new round of financial distress, sparked by fears about the creditworthiness
of America’s leading mortgage lenders, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
The next paragraph on imbalances was somewhat better, calling on “emerging economies
with large and growing current account surpluses” to have “their effective exchange rates
move so that necessary adjustments will occur.” But it offered no signl that the dropping
U.S. dollar would stabilize or rise.
On trade, the G8 called, as always, for the long overdue Doha Development Agenda to
finally get here. But it did nothing concrete to help, despite its critical role in this field in
the past.
An investment more was done. The G8 specified the narrow criteria that should be used
to restrict investment and called for protections to let the rest freely flow. It similarly
called for freer capital markets, welcomed properly governed sovereign wealth funds and
recognized the need for corporate social responsibility from major firms.
On energy little was said and even less was done. While noting the “sharp rise in oil
prices” they called for supply side measures that were well beyond control. On the
demand side, there was no call for energy conservation or many of the other effective
measures the G8 in 1979 had invented and endorsed.
The Host’s Pe rformance
As the G8 chair, Japan’s Fukuda proved to be a genuinely global leader, putting in a
performance worthy of a full A grade of 85%. Much like Prime Minister Mori in 2000,
the last time Japan hosted, Fukuda arrived late as prime minister, had little experience in
international affairs and inherited a design for a leaders-driven summit constructed by
someone else. On the road to Toyako, he also suffered from losing control of his
legislature’s upper house and from plunging popularity at home. But he proceeded with a
high-risk summit, held hostage on its central climate issue as to whether China and South
Korea — hardly Japan’s most trusted partners historically — would come through for
Fukuda on the summit’s final day.
They did, making Fukuda’s great gamble pay off, as it had for Canada’s Jean Chr�tien on
Africa in 2002. Fukuda thus showed himself to be a leader in moving the world forward
on this genuinely global issue. He expanded his leadership in Asia by having China,
South Korea, Indonesia, Australia and more distant Asia follow the path he paved. He
extended his leadership in Africa through TICAD-iv, then the African outreach on the
summit’s opening day and finally by delivering much for Africa on health, food security,
Kirton/7/11/08 10:41 PM 40
compliance monitoring and the breaking crisis in Zimbabwe here democracy and human
life were critically at stake.
Dimensions of G8 Performance
The substantial success of Toyako was further evident in its performance across all of the
six performance dimensions by which any international institutions summit can be
assessed.
Dome stic Political Management
On the first dimension of domestic political management, the Toyako Summit in its long
lead-up has already helped Fukuda from being eased out as prime minister or being
forced to go to the polls before his summit starts. The summit also offers him an
opportunity to show his party colleagues, fellow legislators and voters that he is a world
leader who can deliver results and thus deserves to stay on as PM not least depart with
dignity at an appropriate time. Indeed, as Fukuda’s pre summit tour of Europe ended, and
the summit approach, his approval ratings finally started to rise.
In the U.S., the G8 summit, far more than his many other trips abroad, gave Bush a
chance to boost his polling numbers in his last year and burnish his legacy as a global
leader. If he continued his tradition of announcing shifts in American climate change
policy on the summit’s eve, it could also help his and the summit reputation on this
critical issue for publics in America and elsewhere in the world. Already in America, the
G8 has also received attention from all three major candidates for the presidency, with
the G8 priority issue of energy and the environment being the focus for those on the
Democratic side.
In Russia, the summit also offered the new president Medvedev an opportunity to show
he is a world leader, just as Putin did in 2000. Yet now Medvedev has the much larger
task of establishing his reputation alongside that of a revered Putin with a powerful
presence, in contrast to an ailing Yeltsin, who quickly faded away.
Britain’s Brown was also using the summit to restore his popularity at home. It was he
who led the public demands that the G8 add the food and fuel crises to the summit
agenda a priority concerns.
De libe ration
The second dimension of summit performance is deliberation. Here the one day alone at
eight and the small size and number of the documents pointed to lower performance here,
especially as the agenda for that day and the strategy for releasing the G8’s documents
had not been defined by mid-June. But if the four documents from the G8 had added one
with the Africans and one from the MEM, as was likely, the public dimension of
deliberation would rise. However the invitees, especially the new Outreach 8, who would
Kirton/7/11/08 10:41 PM 41
join the G8 to discuss climate on the final day, had no G8-like tradition of coming to
consensus so that a meaningful communiqu� could be released.
Direc tion Se tting
More promising was the dimension of direction setting, as measured by the number and
breadth, if not the innovation, of the principles and norms the Toyako Summit is likely to
set. A leading indicator here was the substantial list of principles by which the Japanese
would address the agenda, as contained in Fukuda’s Davos speech. That speech also
identified several interconnections or “crosswalks” among the themes and issues,
suggesting the probability of a coherent and consistent package of summit-produced
principles and norms. As Toyako approached reports on the MEM preparatory meeting in
Korea indicated that the leaders would approve some of the bold new principles needed
to put a new beyond Kyoto climate control regime in place.
Dec isional Commitment
The same conclusions carry over into the prospects for collective decision making, in the
form of a large number of commitments, including ambitious ones. The specificity of the
proposals in the Davos speech points in this direction too. This judgment is reinforced by
the range and amount of money mobilized, both in the Davos speech and in subsequently
announcements. These include the $10 billion CIF, which could be counted as official
development assistance (ODA) as outlined by Fukuda at Davos. This British initiative
was to be financed by Japan, Britain and the United States, should their legislatures
approve. As of mid May, none of their G8 partners had signaled they would join this
donors club. But it seemed likely that contributions would come from Germany, Canada
and Australia before Toyako’s end. In addition, Bush was taking the lead in mobilizing
major new money to combat infectious disease.
The strong stress in the summit preparatory process on fulfilling outstanding
commitments rather than making new ones, and the OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) numbers showing dropping ODA flows, place some restraint where
ambitious new commitments, especially those mobilizing money, are concerned. Still, it
is worth recalling that a similar restraint dominated in the immediate lead-up to
Heiligendamm in 2007, only to be overturned at the last minute by NGOs pressing for
more giving and by popularly elected politicians under the glare of the summit’s global
publicity proving eager to please.
De liv ery through Compliance
On the dimension of delivery, on compliance with commitments, the G8’s emphasis on
keeping existing commitments suggests that Toyako is likely to perform well, subject to
the cautions identified immediately above. Also suggesting caution is the fact that money
mobilized — where momentum is concentrated at the moment — has not proven
productive in catalyzing compliance in the pas (Kirton et al. 2007b; Kirton 2006). Nor
Kirton/7/11/08 10:41 PM 42
has referring implementation to other international organizations and Toyako is heading
toward asking the IEA in energy and the UN on climate to help do its work. However, the
G8’s prospective reliance on the IMF and World Bank to assist with finance and
development, and the invitation for the World Bank to attend the summit are promising,
for these are the core international organizations (and G7 controlled ones) in the finance
and development field. They have proven their compliance boosting potency before
(Kirton 2007b, 2006).
Deve lopment of Global Gove rnance
The prospective performance on the development of global governance is also somewhat
promising. The MEM-16 formula will be strengthened and Toyako could even produce to
a plurilateral summit institution similar to the MEM-16 dedicated to climate change. The
Gleneagles Dialogue will be continued in rebranded fashion as the Toyako Dialogue,
dedicated to devising a low carbon society. Both legacies will strengthen the principle
and practice of a G20, at the level of leaders and ministers alike.
In contrast, there will be no bold moves on the outstanding questions of outreach and
expansion. Japan is reluctant and has thus far been increasing outreach at the summit in
ways that dilute China’s distinctiveness and that could delay and make more difficult any
expansion of the G8 toward or into a G13/14.
In regard to civil society, this G8 did well in affirming the multi-stakeholder principle in
the host’s proclamation at Davos. But beyond there were no new G8-centered civil
society institutions that arose in the lead-up to or at the summit itself. With so many
invited guests to attend to, the G8 leaders and host would have little time to deal directly
with civil society at the summit, especially in ways that repeat Japan’s innovation at
Okinawa the last time.
Kirton/7/

関連記事

• 福田政権退陣要求デモ (2008/07/25)
• 消費税と社会保障：日本の増税とカナダの減税 (2008/07/20)
• 洞爺湖サミットでの福田総理の評価 (2008/07/13)
• 日銀人事迷走で福田首相の面子丸つぶれ (2008/04/09)
• 日本政府が汚染された血液製剤を投与された患者に損害賠償を支払う (2007/12/27)

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